<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> <html><head><title>TLS-protected syslog: central server setup</title> </head> <body> <h1>Encrypting Syslog Traffic with TLS (SSL)</h1> <p><small><i>Written by <a href="http://www.adiscon.com/en/people/rainer-gerhards.php">Rainer Gerhards</a> (2008-06-18)</i></small></p> <ul> <li><a href="rsyslog_secure_tls.html">Overview</a> <li><a href="tls_cert_scenario.html">Sample Scenario</a> <li><a href="tls_cert_ca.html">Setting up the CA</a> <li><a href="tls_cert_machine.html">Generating Machine Certificates</a> <li><a href="tls_cert_server.html">Setting up the Central Server</a> <li><a href="tls_cert_client.html">Setting up syslog Clients</a> <li><a href="tls_cert_udp_relay.html">Setting up the UDP syslog relay</a> <li><a href="tls_cert_summary.html">Wrapping it all up</a> </ul> <h3>Setting up the Central Server</h3> <p>In this step, we configure the central server. We assume it accepts messages only via TLS protected plain tcp based syslog from those peers that are explicitely permitted to send to it. The picture below show our configuration. This step configures the server central.example.net. <span style="float: left"> <script type="text/javascript"><!-- google_ad_client = "pub-3204610807458280"; /* rsyslog doc inline */ google_ad_slot = "5958614527"; google_ad_width = 125; google_ad_height = 125; //--> </script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/show_ads.js"> </script> </span> <p><center><img src="tls_cert_100.jpg"></center> <p>Steps to do: <ul> <li>make sure you have a functional CA (<a href="tls_cert_ca.html">Setting up the CA</a>) <li>generate a machine certificate for central.example.net (follow instructions in <a href="tls_cert_machine.html">Generating Machine Certificates</a>) <li>make sure you copy over ca.pem, machine-key.pem ad machine-cert.pem to the central server. Ensure that no user except root can access them (<b>even read permissions are really bad</b>). <li>configure the server so that it accepts messages from all machines in the example.net domain that have certificates from your CA. Alternatively, you may also precisely define from which machine names messages are accepted. See sample rsyslog.conf below. </ul> In this setup, we use wildcards to ease adding new systems. We permit the server to accept messages from systems whos names match *.example.net. <pre><code> $InputTCPServerStreamDriverPermittedPeer *.example.net </code></pre> This will match zuse.example.net and turing.example.net, but NOT pascal.otherdepartment.example.net. If the later would be desired, you can (and need) to include additional permitted peer config statments: <pre><code> $InputTCPServerStreamDriverPermittedPeer *.example.net $InputTCPServerStreamDriverPermittedPeer *.otherdepartment.example.net $InputTCPServerStreamDriverPermittedPeer *.example.com </code></pre> <p>As can be seen with example.com, the different permitted peers need NOT to be in a single domain tree. Also, individual machines can be configured. For example, if only zuse, turing and ada should be able to talk to the server, you can achive this by: <pre><code> $InputTCPServerStreamDriverPermittedPeer zuse.example.net $InputTCPServerStreamDriverPermittedPeer turing.example.net $InputTCPServerStreamDriverPermittedPeer ada.example.net </code></pre> <p>As an extension to the (upcoming) IETF syslog/tls standard, you can specify some text together with a domain component wildcard. So "*server.example.net", "server*.example.net" are valid permitted peers. However "server*Fix.example.net" is NOT a valid wildcard. The IETF standard permits no text along the wildcards. <p>The reason we use wildcards in the default setup is that it makes it easy to add systems without the need to change the central server's configuration. It is important to understand that the central server will accept names <b>only</b> (no exception) if the client certificate was signed by the CA we set up. So if someone tries to create a malicious certificate with a name "zuse.example.net", the server will <b>not</b> accept it. So a wildcard is safe as long as you ensure CA security is not breached. Actually, you authorize a client by issuing the certificate to it. <p><b>At this point, please be reminded once again that your security needs may be quite different from what we assume in this tutorial. Evaluate your options based on your security needs.</b> <h3>Sample syslog.conf</h3> <p>Keep in mind that this rsyslog.conf accepts messages via TCP, only. The only other source accepted is messages from the server itself. <code><pre> $ModLoad imuxsock # local messages $ModLoad imtcp # TCP listener # make gtls driver the default $DefaultNetstreamDriver gtls # certificate files $DefaultNetstreamDriverCAFile /rsyslog/protected/ca.pem $DefaultNetstreamDriverCertFile /rsyslog/protected/machine-cert.pem $DefaultNetstreamDriverKeyFile /rsyslog/protected/machine-key.pem $InputTCPServerStreamDriverAuthMode x509/name $InputTCPServerStreamDriverPermittedPeer *.example.net $InputTCPServerStreamDriverMode 1 # run driver in TLS-only mode $InputTCPServerRun 10514 # start up listener at port 10514 </pre></code> <p><font color="red"><b>Be sure to safeguard at least the private key (machine-key.pem)!</b> If some third party obtains it, you security is broken!</font> <h2>Copyright</h2> <p>Copyright (c) 2008 <a href="http://www.adiscon.com/en/people/rainer-gerhards.php">Rainer Gerhards</a> and <a href="http://www.adiscon.com/en/">Adiscon</a>.</p> <p> Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license can be viewed at <a href="http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html">http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html</a>.</p> </body></html>